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‘Community is at the core of football, and with it notions of identity and place’

Wednesday, September 3rd, 2014

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In his latest book, ’Taking Our Ball Back: English Football’s Culture Wars, MARTIN CLOAKE quotes political philosopher Michael Sandel’s statement that “The pleasure of sports has been diminished by its commerciality.” One of the central questions running through the collection of articles that make up the book is how the thing that makes sport so commercially valuable can be prevented from destroying what makes it so commercially valuable. It’s a complex discussion, but, as Cloake contends, one that has resonance beyond football.

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M CloakeBy Martin Cloake

3 September 2014

It is possible to trace a social, economic and political history of England alongside a history of its football clubs. And the current deep sense of discontent in the English game is rooted in this fact.

The roots of England’s football clubs lie in the efforts of church and factory to create community. Those who stood in the pulpit saw something that could provide a more wholesome outlet for the energies of the mass than drink and brawling. That mass of people had been brought together as never before by industry, and it is industry that looms large in English football’s formative years. The game’s early giants came from Blackburn, Preston, Burnley, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham, Bolton, Derby, Nottingham, Stoke, brought together by men connected with steel, railways, textiles, manufacturing.

The world’s first Industrial Revolution shaped England, and England’s sport. Community is at the core of football, and with it notions of identity and place.

As the country changed, so did football. As the heavy industrial age petered out, affecting the fortunes of the early northern giants, the suburbs began to rise in the south. London, of course, had its industrial clubs, West Ham from the Thames Ironworks, Millwall from the docks, Arsenal from the munitions plant in Woolwich. But there was also Fulham, formed by a schoolteacher and churchmaster; Chelsea, established by a businessman who wanted to utilise a stadium; and Tottenham Hotspur, formed by a group of middle class boys under the watchful eye of a Bible teacher from a local church.

These were teams that rose to represent the south and the suburbs, the new world. When Tottenham Hotspur took on Sheffield United in the 1901 FA Cup final, 110,000 went to Crystal Palace Park in south east London to see the Flower of the South against the established might of the north. A turning point in football on the turn of the century itself.

Now, the Premier League is the richest and most glamorous in the world, English football is an in-demand global brand. But while it attracts support it does not inspire love. Love the game, hate the business; love the team, hate the club. The phrases fall readily from the lips of fans struggling with the contradictions that define them as football supporters. So too does the word ‘meaning’.

Football is successful commercially because it means something. The trouble is, we’re not sure what any more.

For many fans at many English clubs, it seems increasingly as if they support an idea that ceased to exist some time ago, a name that once meant something but is now just a badge sitting atop a global corporation or, most recently, a foreign government’s public relations spin. Those who own and administrate are also confused. The money is rolling in, facilities are better …  hell, there are even toilets for men AND women at grounds, so modern and customer-orientated has the game become. And yet there is still discontent. Why, they wonder, can the fans not be happy?

It’s becoming fashionable to say, especially of football, that business is ruining sport. It’s the language that irritates the most, turning fans into customers, games into matchday experiences and throwing up job titles such as Head of Fan Relationship Management. Someone who held that very post at Manchester City, Claudio Borges, caused much hoo-ha last year by saying of the fans that his job was to “engage them, serve them and monetise them”. He quickly had to replace “monetise” with “provide fans with relevant commercial opportunities”.

Writing about the incident in The Independent, journalist Michael Calvin aired his displeasure with the way things were going, talking of “Big Brother” “robo-marketers” and the battle between “idealists and monetisers”. I have a lot of sympathy with those reactions. But I’m wary of a hairshirtist tendency that says commercialism is the cancer at the heart of sport.Taking Our Ball Back cover

If you’re going to pay people to play sport, you introduce an element of commercialism. It was the growth of paid professionalism that swept unpaid amateurism aside and opened sport up for mass participation. In Matt and Martin Rogan’s book Britain and the Olympic Games, the authors write of efforts to “preserve sports club membership for the social elite. Those who competed for wages were excluded … In this sense amateurism was initially nothing more than a convenient way of preserving sport for the elite.”

This apparent clash between a yearning for a more Corinthian approach and a distaste for the vulgarity that commerce has inflicted upon sport is central to any effort to make sense of modern sport. I went to speak to Matt, who is now MD of Two Circles, a customer relationship company that uses data to “help sporting organisations get closer to their customers”. It’s the kind of description that may already have caused some hackles to rise, but I know from working alongside Matt that he has a genuine passion for sport and a keen understanding of where the commercial element fits in.

He starts off by pointing out that the most visible sports represent “a small percentage of the sport actually played in this country. Football, for example, only accounts for just over 10 per cent of the 15 million people in this country who play sport every week,’’ he says. “With sport, once it becomes a business, just like any business you get some that are well run and in it for the long term, and some that are not,” he says. “Remaining successful has to be about having a sustained customer base that cares about what you do.”

Creating that base involves nothing more complicated, he says, than “finding out what your customers want and giving it to them. When you look at the long tail of participation sports in this country, the business of sport is fundamental to them creating a sustainable operation. Government funds simply won’t allow survival by subsidy, so they have to no option but to think differently”.

He talks about the success of Harlequins rugby union club, where community outreach (junior teams are coached on Saturday mornings and invited to stay on for the match) and taking on board what supporters think has created one of the fastest-growing supporter bases in the country. Harlequins gather feedback after every match, and fan satisfaction is consistently the highest he has ever seen.

At Reading FC, the number of season ticket holders increased after the club was relegated two seasons ago, again through genuine community engagement. In cricket, ’Last Man Stands’, an 8-a-side 20-over league in urban areas run on weekday evenings, is bringing new people into the game, in particular ethnic minorities. In a much-publicised step a customer survey drove the creation of the County fixture list a few seasons back.

While sports need to stand on their old two feet financially, that doesn’t always mean the fan pays the bill. Triathlon England – which has seen huge growth in participation, having almost tripled its membership – works with local authorities to get the high cost of entry down by arranging bike loans or splitting entry fees with local sports centres. Cycling’s success has come on the back not just of high-profile success but because a large commercial partner – Sky – “enables the sport to have the funding to develop programmes that are right for different kinds of customers” such as women’s cycling programme ‘Breeze’ and school cycling proficiency schemes.

The idea of creating a sustainable base runs through all these examples, and this is where the drivers of the business and the sporting institution come together, reckons Rogan. One of the most striking things he says is that: “Sponsors have been disenfranchised by clubs and sports that don’t have a true, empathetic, warm relationship with their customers.” He goes on: “Any sporting organisation right now that doesn’t put customers at the heart of its sponsorship proposition is in real danger. Big brands are finally realising it’s incongruous to spend most of their time and budget getting closer to customers and then take a sponsorship and say ‘just a logo and some pricey hospitality for us thanks’. Sports fans can see that a mile off. Budweiser missed a trick at the FA Cup Final [in 2013] not transporting fans from Wigan back home from Wembley, when the kick off-time meant they could not get home by train.”

He recognises football is a special case, not just because of the popularity of the top clubs, but also because of the way it’s run. The Premier League is there to return money to its member clubs, so doesn’t necessarily have the relationship with the grass roots that, say, the England and Wales Cricket Board does. And, he says: “The way any business is run is a lot to do with how it’s owned. You’ll get a business that’s under private equity ownership that’s driven hard for short-term profits and a lot of the time you’ll find the care for employees and the push for long-term foundations isn’t necessarily there.”

He is eager to point out there are some examples of good practice – even in what may seem the unlikeliest of places. “Notwithstanding the enormous loss Manchester City made in the first year of the current ownership, I’ve got a lot of respect for the way they have gone about thinking about the growth and ongoing development of their club. The first things they did weren’t about customer revenue, but about customer relationships. So they put a large infrastructure around the stadium that just sold beer in a way that was quick and easy and made it easy for fans to meet before the game. They developed a membership proposition that was just about rewarding loyalty, and the basic level of that was free. They did a lot of smart things that weren’t about revenue growth but about creating the sort of links with supporters that Manchester City hasn’t had for 20 years.”

He thinks many football clubs need to think smarter about ticket prices, for example, returning to the relationship with sponsors to illustrate his point. “You can create a more sustainable revenue line by giving people what they want rather than imposing blanket price rises,” he says.

Putting £30 on every ticket will provide more short-term profit than devising a meaningful membership package for kids that creates a more sustainable base long term, but that doesn’t mean it’s the right thing to do. Creating a unique package that sponsors really want and charging them an extra £100 per seat could please both sponsor and bank manager, and subsidise the kids’ seats. “You have to understand the long-term benefit,” he says.

He reckons sport “needs to be more confident about what it has to offer”, but says “that confidence can’t be built on sand. Some of the organisations we work with have millions of people engaging with them and loving them month in, month out. Generically telling that to a business just sounds like a sales pitch. Providing evidence of that to a business changes the view of what sport can offer.”

You could dismiss Rogan’s comments as yet more “robo-marketing”. But you would be wrong. For it’s not the business of sport itself that is the problem, but the way the business is often conducted. Whether you call it listening to the fans or building a sustained customer base, it all comes down to giving the fans what they want. The trouble with too many in football is that they are telling the fans what they want – that’s when they bother to communicate properly with them at all. If we want to change the direction the game is taking, we may need to ask not what the business of sport does to us, but what it can do for us.

 

This article is an edited extract from Martin’s book Taking Our Ball Back: English Football’s Culture Wars, available now. It features material first published in Thin White Line magazine and at New Statesman online. More from Martin Cloake on his blog: www.blog.martincloake.com;  website: www.martincloake.com; Twitter: @MartinCloake

 

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MOTD at 50: ‘Interesting, very interesting … Oh look at his face, just look at his face’

Friday, August 22nd, 2014

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By Nick Harris

22 August 2014

When the first episode of Match of the Day was screened 50 years ago today, there were more than twice as many people inside Anfield watching Liverpool beat Arsenal 3-2 than there were watching on TV later.

MoTD was a one-game show then, screening whatever was deemed to be the match of the day. Just 20,000 souls tuned into the first broadcast to see extended highlights of a win for Bill Shankly’s men, played in front of a crowd of 47,620.

MOTDNobody in Liverpool saw the programme. For most of its inaugural season, the show was only screened in the London area, although some people in the Midlands could pick up ‘sample viewings’ towards the end of that campaign.

MoTD was not an immediate hit with the clubs, even as the BBC began to sell it in Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Rhodesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Kenya. Some clubs feared that televised football, even though not live, would hurt gates. There was thus a two-month stand-off over the contract renewal for MoTD to broadcast in 1965-66, and the clubs only agreed to it after their collective fee for the year was doubled to £25,000.

That cash was split between the 92 clubs from likes of the high-flying Liverpool, Burnley and Northampton in the top division to the lowlier Southport, Barrow and Bradford Park Avenue in the fourth tier. Clubs from all divisions could theoretically feature on MoTD then. The money worked out, on average, at £271.74 per club in 1965-66, or double the £135.87 of the year before

This current season, 2014-15, the BBC are paying £59.9m to show highlights of the Premier League alone as part of the current £179.7m three-year MoTD deal. That’s £3m per club per season, give or take, or more than 22,000 times more per club than 50 years ago.

What hasn’t changed over five decades is the enduring appeal of what is, when it boils down to it, is a simple package of clips and talking heads. Up to five million people watch each Saturday, an astonishing figure in an age where live sport, not highlights, takes primacy.

Barry Davies, the doyen of British sports commentators, worked on MoTD from 1969 to 2004, commentating and sometimes presenting.

‘It wasn’t available to the whole country when it started and many people thought it would never catch on,’ he says. ‘The powers-that-be were certain that it would, and after England won the World Cup in 1966, it really took off.’

Having been on BBC2 from 1964 to 1966, MoTD made the leap to BBC1, and the mainstream, after the heroics of Alf Ramsey’s England team, even though league champions Liverpool and FA Cup holders Everton were among a minority of clubs still unhappy with it.

‘The viewers’ sense was they were watching the best football in the world, and England were the best having won the World Cup,’ Davies says. ‘Pubs would empty just before 10pm on Saturday so people could get home to watch. It sounds extraordinary now but it was true. I was in awe of it as a programme.’

Davies’ break came when producers decided to experiment with a new format for the 1969-70 season. Instead of just one game, MoTD would feature one ‘main’ match plus highlights of a second on each show, on a regional basis. Viewers in the north-west would get their ‘extra’ game from the north-west, for example, and Londoners a match from the capital, and so on.

Davies joined the BBC from ITV in summer 1969, a few months before his 32nd birthday, to commentate primarily on north-west matches. He would become part of a line of treasured household names associated with the show, from Kenneth Wolstenhome and David Coleman in the early years, to Jimmy Hill, John Motson, Des Lynam and latterly Gary Lineker.

Davies’s first assignment was supposed to be covering Leeds against Tottenham on 9 August 1969. But over breakfast in Leeds he was told Coleman had laryngitis and would miss his own match, Crystal Palace against Manchester United, for which Davies was now expected to stand in. He dashed to London. ‘My preparation was virtually nil,’ he says. He commentated on a 2-2 draw, Bobby Charlton scoring one of United’s goals, and then hurried to the BBC’s Lime Grove studios where he helped Frank Bough to present that night’s MoTD, as two Palace players, Roger Hynd and Gerry Queen, were studio guests.

The 1969-70 experiment of regional second matches did not work. The second match wasn’t always good quality; resources were thinner than now, cameras less common. By 1970-71, more resources were pushed into a two-match show each week, expanding over time to be highlights of multiple games.

‘The biggest change in football in 50 years is, I’d say, that it’s no longer the game of the man in the street,’ Davies says. ‘The general public, the working public, had a rapport with the players they no longer have. When I started, players didn’t turn up in swish coaches or even swisher cars. You had a chance to establish relationships, as did the supporters.

‘There were also so many less reporters, less microphones. It was much easier to be able to talk to people, not like the Fort Knox that Old Trafford and other grounds have become today.’

MoTD held clout in those early years to bring important matters to wide attention, even to influence the laws. A case in point was a 1970 game Davies commentated on between Coventry and Everton. From a free-kick Coventry’s Willie Carr sandwiched the ball between his ankles, jumped in the air and flicked it back to tee-up team-mate Ernie Hunt for a spectacular volleyed goal. Clips are available on YouTube (here). By season’s end any such manoeuvre was outlawed as it was deemed a ‘double touch’. MoTD had brought it to everyone’s attention.

Davies’s mellifluous, measured tones can still be found on archive footage accompanying classic clips, such as one from December 1974 when title rivals Manchester City and Derby met at Maine Road. Former City hero Franny Lee scored the winner for Dave Macaky’s Derby, who would go on to win the title. Davies’s prescient commentary summed up the importance.

‘Interesting,’ he said as Lee unleashed his shot. ‘Very interesting,’ he added as it screamed into the top corner. ‘Oh, look at his face, just look at his face,’ he added, telling viewers all they needed to know about the potential consequences.

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Every viewer will have their own favourite MoTD moments. Many will recall Alan Hansen, for example, on 19 August 1995, telling viewers, after a 3-1 win by Aston Villa over Manchester United: ‘You can’t win anything with kids.’ United went on to win the Double that season.

Davies recalls how, a few years later, in 2001, the BBC lost the rights to highlights. ‘I was among those who felt maybe the BBC’s highlights days were up for good then,’ he says. ‘But they came back. The audience was still there. And still is. Match of the Day is still something people want to see, and that says a lot about the football public, and the appeal of the straightforward simplicity of the programme.’

A version of this article appeared in the Mail on Sunday earlier this month, linked here.

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‘Sport does not exist in a vacuum. Fifa has a responsibility to act on Russia’

Tuesday, July 29th, 2014

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Roger PielkeBy Roger Pielke Jr

29 July 2014

Over the weekend, British deputy prime minister Nick Clegg told the Sunday Times that Russia should be stripped of the 2018 World Cup. Clegg joins several senior German politicians in calling for the next World Cup to be moved as a sanction against Russia for its role in the continuing conflict in the Ukraine. The renewed calls for sanctions have been prompted by the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines 17 over eastern Ukraine, allegedly by Russian-supported Ukrainian separatists.

Does FIFA have a responsibility to engage in global geopolitics? Its history and actions say yes.

Yet FIFA’s first reaction to calls for stripping Russia of the World Cup prompted FIFA on July 25th to issue a “Statement on Russia 2018.” In it FIFA rejected calls to revisit the 2018 World Cup hosting decision: “History has shown so far that boycotting sport events or a policy of isolation or confrontation are not the most effective ways to solve problems.” FIFA continues: “We have seen that the FIFA World Cup can be a force for good and FIFA believes this will be the case for the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia.”

Yet, FIFA’s reading of history is not quite right. Decisions about football competitions based on political considerations, including international sanctions, have a rich history. Just two weeks ago the UEFA Emergency Committee decided that no Champions League or Europa Cup matches are to be played in Ukraine or Israel. These decisions were based on concerns about the ongoing conflicts.  Another decision was made “in light of the current political situation,” with UEFA deciding that teams from Russia and Ukraine will not be allowed to face each other in the international competitions.Russia flag

While the recent UEFA decisions might be characterized solely in terms of security, there is a far more direct precedent. In March 1991, the Yugoslavian team Red Star Belgrade defeated Olympique Marseille to win the European Cup,  the event now known as the Champions League. Less than five months after reaching the pinnacle of European football, Yugoslavia was the subject of the first of a long series of United Nations Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the nation due to its escalating civil war. These sanctions included explicit mention of sport and they prompted football governance organizations to respond.

In early 1992 the UN Security Council passed a resolution (number 757) calling on all states to “take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Both FIFA, which oversees global football, and UEFA, which oversees European competitions under FIFA, followed up on the UN sanctions by prohibiting Yugoslavia from participating in the European championships or in qualifying for the World Cup. Of note, Yugoslavia’s replacement in the 1992 European Championships was Denmark, who subsequently went on to win the competition.

The UEFA sanctions also meant that Yugoslavian club teams could not participate in international competitions. This included the recent European champions Red Star Belgrade.  The Sunday Times opined that “For the man in the street, Red Star’s disintegration has been more devastating than any other effect of UN sanctions” (quoted in Mills 2009). Before Yugoslavia ultimately disintegrated into independent nations it was allowed back into international football competition in December 1996, and both it and Croatia, formerly part of Yugoslavia, qualified for the 1998 World Cup.

The Yugoslavian case is not unique. As long ago as 1961 FIFA suspended the South African football association from participation over the issue of apartheid, following the actions of the African Football Confederation (CAF) three years earlier. In this case FIFA acted before the United Nations imposed sanctions. The issue of South Africa’s participation became a major point of contention within FIFA itself over more than a decade.

FIFA has also used football as a diplomatic carrot. In 1998 Joao Havelange, president of FIFA, announced that FIFA would organize a football match between Israel and Palestine. He exclaimed: “Where politics, diplomacy and the business world have failed, I believe that football can succeed” (quoted in Boniface 2002). Obviously not.

History shows that of course sports organizations respond to political context. FIFA (and its member confederations) have included geopolitical considerations in their decisions about participation and hosting of football competitions, including the World Cup.  FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, likes to present himself as the equivalent of a head of state. And FIFA is quick to engage in geopolitics when deciding on where to host the World Cup.  Sport does not exist in a vacuum, of course FIFA cannot ignore global geopolitics. FIFA has a responsibility to engage, even when the stakes involve more than its own narrow interests.

Thus it is unlikely that FIFA’s July 25th statement reaffirming its support for Russia 2018 will be the last word on this subject. In particular, if the United Nations or even the European Union decides to impose sanctions upon Russia, pressure will increase dramatically on FIFA to respond accordingly. The Yugoslavian experience sets a powerful recent precedent.

Russia is spending a reported $20 billion on preparing for the 2018 World Cup. However, the costs of stripping the nation of the World Cup would likely be much greater than these direct costs and go far beyond those which can be measured in dollars. Europe has faced international criticism for its divided views on imposing economic sanctions on Russia. But the reality is that Russia is in a position to inflict severe economic pain on Europe as well, due to its significant reliance on Russian gas.

Right now it appears that neither FIFA, UEFA nor the EU are prepared to take any steps to question Russia’s hosting of the 2018 World Cup. No doubt they are hoping for a resolution of the conflict in a manner the does not involve international sanctions. However, politicians have already started the sanctioning equivalent of rattling swords. Such calls to use the 2018 World Cup as a means of punishing Vladimir Putin and Russia will likely become louder the longer the Ukrainian conflict continues.

Ultimately, if the Ukrainian conflict escalates to the point where the United Nations begins to discuss sanctions, the Yugoslavian precedent means that it would likely be difficult to exclude sport as part of that discussion. Not only would such steps call into question the 2018 World Cup, but also the participation of Russian clubs in international competitions as well as effects on other international sports. With the rise of football in its visibility and significance around the world, so too has its value as a bargaining chip in international politics. Russia 2018 is far from settled.

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Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor of environmental studies at the University of Colorado, where he also directs its Center for Science and technology Policy Research. He studies, teaches and writes about science, innovation, politics and sports. He has written for The New York TimesThe GuardianFiveThirtyEight, and The Wall Street Journal among many other places. He is thrilled to join Sportingintelligence as a regular contributor. Follow Roger on Twitter: @RogerPielkeJR and on his blog

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‘Could England play “the German way”? Of course not … It is never going to be’

Monday, July 21st, 2014

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Tim RichBy Tim Rich

21 July 2014

Before I was married, I used to go to weddings and sit at the back as the bride and groom danced to the first song – usually something utterly inappropriate like Careless Whisper or the Police’s creepy Every Breath you Take. I would wonder why it wasn’t me up there in the middle of all the flashbulbs, grinning like the star of a commercial for Colgate. Why not me?

A lot of English footballers, particularly those who returned from the World Cup to be greeted by crowds of zero, would have similar feelings watching the Germans parade the World Cup through the streets of Berlin. Are Theo Walcott, Wayne Rooney or Joe Hart so very different from Philipp Lahm, Bastian Schweinsteiger or Manuel Neuer? Why not them?

In the aftermath of Germany’s triumph, there was an avalanche of articles on how England should ‘play the German way’ or whether the model of youth academies and hot-house coaching developed after their failure to get out of the group stages in Euro 2000, could work in England.

Of course it couldn’t. Lahm, Schweinsteiger and Neuer play their football in a league that is recognisably German , for clubs that are owned by Germans and controlled by a German FA that has been run to a tested, structured plan for the last 14 years.

Walcott, Rooney and Hart play in what is known abroad as the English Premier League, which increasingly has as little to do with England as the North American Soccer League – which provided employment and hefty cheques for the ageing shapes of Pele, Franz Beckenbauer and George Best – had to do with North America.

None of the big four English clubs that will compete in next season’s Champions League is owned by an Englishman.

Each Premier League club employs on average 16 foreign footballers. In La Liga it is nine, mostly Spanish-speaking South Americans. In the Bundesliga it is six. You don’t have to be Nigel Farage to wonder if this might not be disastrous.

Half the Germany side that won the World Cup also won the European Under-21 championship in 2009, beating England 4-0 in the final. Only James Milner of the beaten England side went to Brazil, although Theo Walcott would have joined him had the Arsenal striker been fit.

Jack Rodwell played the final dozen minutes of that game in Malmo and what happened to one of England’s brightest midfielders gives an indication of why for all the investment in club academies and the building of the FA’s centre of excellence at St George’s Park, the project will be derailed by the Premier League’s own clubs.

In 2009 Rodwell was 18, playing for Everton and considered one of the outstanding midfield talents of his generation. Three years later, having featured in 85 league games for the club, he moved to Manchester City, who had just won the Premier League, for £12m. He was often injured which was nobody’s fault but when he was available, Rodwell was barely used. His sum total of first-team football in 2014 clocks in at 89 minutes. It would have been laughable for Rodwell to have been even considered for a place in Roy Hodgson’s World Cup squad.

Much the same happened to Scott Sinclair who signed for Manchester City from Swansea, just in time to miss out on their triumphant League Cup campaign and then disappeared. Both Rodwell and Sinclair would be counted as among the 30 per cent of English players in the English Premier League. The true depth of talent available to Hodgson is far smaller.

The pool of English managerial talent available to those wanting a replacement for Hodgson is also frighteningly small. The Premier League has five English managers – Steve Bruce, Harry Redknapp, Alan Pardew. Sean Dyche and Sam Allardyce. Dyche who has yet to manage a game in the Premier League, is the only one under 50. None has ever won a major trophy. Redknapp is the only one to have managed in the Champions League and that was one season with Tottenham.

In the wake of the German triumph, one newspaper published a photo of Jack Wilshere smoking while on holiday under the headline “Will We Never Learn?” We did not fail in Brazil because Wilshere had a fag. We failed because our resources are so slim that Hodgson felt he had no choice but to take a palpably unfit midfielder like Wilshere to Brazil.

He did not take Ashley Cole, who having arranged a transfer to Roma, wondered why more English footballers, especially those denied first-team football, did not play abroad. His namesake and one-time team-mate at Chelsea, Joe Cole did just that, spending half a season at Lille.

Cole enjoyed his time with a team that was competing for the French championship and had qualified for the Champions League. They wanted him to stay but could not afford the £90,000 a week wages he was being paid. So, instead of facing Bayern Munich or Paris St Germain, Cole returned to Liverpool reserves and then to his comfort zone at West Ham. He will never play in the Champions League again.

We can watch from the back of the room at the Germans parading the World Cup like a trophy bride but there is no point in waiting to catch the bouquet. Unless some fundamental attitudes change, it is never going to be us.

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This article first appeared on RichMedia

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A doping conundrum: just $6m a year on developing new tests, $350m on testing

Monday, July 21st, 2014

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Roger PielkeBy Roger Pielke Jr

21 July 2014

Speaking last week in Australia, the winner of the 2011 Tour de France winner, Cadel Evans, claimed that professional cycling today is cleaner than at any time in his experience. The 37-year-old Aussie rider said: “It’s in the best shape – maybe not economically – but the best shape ethically and sporting-wise that the sport has ever been in, certainly since I’ve been involved in the sport.”

Yet on that same day Team Sky, who employ the past two Tour winners in Bradley Wiggins and Chris Froome, announced that they had parted ways with one of their team members, Jonathan Tiernan-Locke, following a suspension for doping by the International Cycling Union (UCI). The alleged violations are said to have taken place prior to Tiernan-Locke joining Sky. But it adds to a growing list of allegations surrounding the “squeaky clean” reputation of Team Sky.

If road cycling’s self-proclaimed cleanest team has a range of issues to face, then what of the wider sport?

How can we really know if the Tour de France is indeed in better shape today than in past years? Are the anti-doping regulations trustworthy? Better data and independent analyses can help to shed some light on these questions.

We know that doping was endemic in the Tour de France through much of the 1990s and 2000s thanks to years of investigation by investigative reporters and the claims of whistleblowers. But it wasn’t until the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) released its report on the allegations surrounding seven-time Tour winner Lance Armstrong that the Tour’s recent doping history became widely accepted.

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L'Alpe d'Huez fastest

With the advantage of this hindsight, in the graph above we can see the effects of the availability of Erythropoietin, better known as EPO, starting in the early 1990s in the Tour de France. (The data comes with the usual caveats.)

The graph shows the climb times of l’Alpe d’Huez, one of the most famous ascents of the tour, which has been included in the Tour in most years. From 1994 to 2008 the fastest time each year averaged some four and a half minutes faster than the average winning time from 1977-1993. One might think that such a remarkable and sudden increase in speed would have raised some eyebrows. However, tracking performance times by Tour riders has never been made particularly accessible by the Tour or the UCI.

Doping in sport refers to the use of prohibited, performance-enhancing substances by athletes. For the Olympic sports, which include international cycling and the Tour de France, doping violations are identified by the World Anti-Doping Agency and its partners (including USADA). Specifically, according to WADA doping occurs when two of the three criteria are met: (a) a substance potentially or actually enhances athletic performance, (b) the substance poses a health risk to the athlete, and (c) use of the substance violations what WADA calls “the spirit of sport.”

Each year WADA creates a list of banned substances which it deems to have met these criteria. Doping is thus a procedural violation of very specific rules governing competition.

Oversight of doping is such a shared value in sport that 176 countries have signed on to the UN’s International Convention Against Doping in Sport. For instance, USADA is recognized by the US Congress as the non-governmental body responsible for fulfilling the US obligations under the treaty. USADA receives about $10 million per year from the US government.

With doping deemed so important internationally and nationally, it is fair to ask why it took so long to catch Lance Armstrong and others who broke the rules. This is especially a question worth asking given the huge step change in performance, as shown above. The data seem to suggest that something fairly obvious was going on in the Tour de France starting in the early 1990s.

Others have looked at performance data and concluded that other performances, still on the record books, were the result of doping. For instance, Le Monde  has raised questions about the “mutant” performances of Miguel Indurain in the 1990s. The only riders who ascended Alpe d’Huez faster than Indurain in the Tour were Armstrong, Jan Ulrich and Marco Pantani, each of whom doped.

But “mutant” times, by themselves are not sufficient to prove a doping violation. Doping is so difficult to detect and to reduce for at least three reasons.

First, performance data is not definitive of violations of the WADA list. In athletics, records are of course broken all the time. It would be a shame if every record-breaking performance was clouded by speculation and allegation of doping violations. But this is exactly what happened when Ye Shi-Wen, a Chinese swimmer, won the Gold medal in the 400m IM at London 2012, and in the process shaving five seconds off of her personal best time. At the time Ross Tucker, a sports scientist with expertise in human performance, wrote “don’t shy away from the question just because it’s politically incorrect – look where that got sport before.”

While Ye Shi-Wen never failed a drug test or otherwise was shown to break any rules, there is some valuable data to be gleaned from looking at performance data for evidence of doping. That is the argument made by Simon Ernst and Perikles Simon of Johannes-Gutenberg University in Germany in a recent paper.

They argue that the signature of EPO can be seen in the top 20 times run each year in the men’s 5000m race. The chart below shows a dramatic improvement in times from 1991 to 1996, what they call “the EPO effect.” They also claim that “the introduction of EPO testing in 2000 led to significant increases in running times.”  The subsequent release of a new EPO test in 2008 is also accompanied by an increase in race times. They caution however that “the concrete connection with doping can only be made by assumption or in retrospect.”

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5000 m men

A second reason why doping is so hard to detect and reduce is that dopers are one step ahead of their pursuers. Simon explains that drug testing, to identify doping, is fraught with loopholes. For instance, while anabolic steroids are readily detectable, other substances like EPO, human growth hormone and testosterone can be administered at levels which enhance performance, but are not detectable by current methods.

This raises a difficult set of questions – if a violation of the WADA regulations occurs but cannot be detected by contemporary drug testing methods, should it be on the WADA list in the first place? Alternatively, how long do we want to keep testing samples in hopes that future scientific advances can be used to detect violations which were undetectable at the time of the event? Even more perplexing, how should we think about performance-enhancing substances which were once used but later added to the WADA list (or vice-versa)?

There are no easy or unambiguous answers to such questions, but they do need to be dealt with, as the search for performance enhancement, whether allowed or prohibited, is not going away.

For instance, in a survey conducted by WADA of more than 2,000 elite track and field athletes, 29 per cent at the 2011 World Championships and 45 per cent at the 2011 Pan-Arab Games admitted to the use of prohibited performance enhancing drugs. This contrasts to a detection rate of only about 2 per cent for the drug tests used to detect doping.

Perikles Simon explains that this disparity between anonymous admission and formal dtection is partly due to the fact that only about $6 million per year is spent on developing new tests, in contrast to $350 million spent on giving drug tests.

Ernst and Simon also looked at men’s 100m times and identified a large reduction in times from 2006 to 2011 (below, they found a similar improvement at 200m, not shown here).  They speculate that the improvement is due to the introduction of Insulin-like Growth Factor-1 (IGF-1) into the medicine cabinet of sprinters: “In our opinion, IGF-1 is the source for the most recent improvements in male short-distance running.” Over this time period the use of IGF-1 was not detectable. They are careful to observe that there are other possible explanations, such as the use of other drugs or different populations and training of athletes.

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100m men

A third reason for the difficulty in detecting doping is that sports governance bodies may not want to hear bad news, and thus have an incentive to downplay or even cover up doping violations. The UCI, which oversees cycling, is in the midst of a year-long investigation to assess the agency’s poor performance, and perhaps even corruption, during the Lance Armstrong era. The UCI has been accused of covering up a drug test that Armstrong failed, of taking a bribe and of having its leadership financially involved with Armstrong’s team.

In another example, the WADA survey mentioned above was surrounded by controversy when WADA tried to halt its release over the objections of the researchers who conducted the study. Richard Pound, a former WADA chairman, explained: “There’s this psychological aspect about it: nobody wants to catch anybody. There’s no incentive. Countries are embarrassed if their nationals are caught. And sports are embarrassed if someone from their sport is caught.”

One thing we can be sure of — doping in sport is here to stay. An important question for athletes, fans and those who oversee the games is, how much effort should be spent to root out doping? This question lead to some complicated issues that go well beyond just sport. For instance, how do we balance the rights of athletes to privacy and due process while also implementing a more rigorous and some say already too rigorous) regime of testing?

The Tour de France provides a window into a complex world of human enhancement, global governance and the desire to excel, sometimes at all costs. While the Tour may indeed be cleaner that it’s been in a generation, as Cadel Evans alleges, the questions surrounding how to handle doping in sport remain as vexing and unresolved as ever.

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Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor of environmental studies at the University of Colorado, where he also directs its Center for Science and technology Policy Research. He studies, teaches and writes about science, innovation, politics and sports. He has written for The New York TimesThe GuardianFiveThirtyEight, and The Wall Street Journal among many other places. He is thrilled to join Sportingintelligence as a regular contributor. Follow Roger on Twitter: @RogerPielkeJR and on his blog

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Upsets, giant-killings, adios, bye-bye: FIFA rankings STILL ahead in predicting results

Friday, June 20th, 2014

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At the completion of the Italy-Costa Rica match in Group D in Recife, half of the 2014 World Cup group games (24 of 48) had been played.  There have been expected victories for some nations, big upsets for others – Adios Spain! Bye-bye England! - and more goals than most fans would have expected. So who could have forecast this? Actually, a huge variety of ‘experts’, forecasters, theorists, modelers and systems have tried to predict the outcome of this tournament, from Goldman Sachs to boffin statistical organisations. In his second post for Sportingintelligence, and as part of an ongoing evaluation of rates of success (click HERE for Part 1 and background), Roger Pielke Jr sorts the best from the rest. 

Follow Roger on Twitter: @RogerPielkeJR and on his blog

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Roger PielkeBy Roger Pielke Jr.

20 June 2014

With Costa Rica’s surprising victory over Italy the group stages have reached their halfway point, with 24 of 48 matches in the books. There is still a lot to be decided and the same goes for the World Cup prediction evaluation exercise that I’m tracking. But like the World Cup itself a few pieces are starting to fall into place.

For background detail on the 11 different prognostications we are tracking, see the original piece; but their identities are clear enough in general in the updated prediction league table (below), which is starting to show some spread.

The FIFA Rankings and Andrew Yuan are sitting at the top with 16 correct outcomes from 24 games. The naïve forecast that I chose to use as a threshold of skill, based on transfer values, has slipped into last place alongside Infostrada and the FT.

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Pielke 11 WC predictions, 24 games

The spread across the methods in matches picked correctly is only three games, which would suggest a chance for those behind to catch up. I was curious about this so I created a crosstab showing how many of the 48 matches that each method has in common with each of the others. It shows that catching up is possible, but the opportunities are limited.

I was surprised to see how many matches are in common across the methods. For example, across the 48 group stage matches the approach based on estimated player transfer values has between 36 and 42 matches in common with each of the 11 prediction methods that I am tracking.

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Pielke WC sameness

On the one hand, this makes sense as the powers in world football are generally the same independent of methodology. If the top eight teams across the groups are each predicted to win their group stage matches, then that alone accounts for 24 of the 48 total matches. But on the other hand, skillful prediction means outperforming a simple approach, so it should be fully expected that a skilled method would be able to identify some of the opportunities for upsets.

For instance, several of the methods lost all of the matches played by Spain and England, including the transfer value baseline. Were those games inherently unpredictable? Or do they reflect a fundamental conservativism in the methods? In an alternate universe where England won their first two matches, the FIFA rankings would trail the transfer value approach, and the Elo ratings would be out in front all alone.

The FT method (which to be fair, was designed to say something about players not teams) has the greatest deviation from the other approaches, with Goldman Sachs not far behind. These approaches thus have offer a much wider spread of predictive outcomes, which could mean a big improvement on the baseline approach or a big degradation.

Prediction entails risk, and most methods have taken very little. It is well understood in studies of risk that we’d rather take a high probability of being right or wrong with the crowd, rather than stick our necks out and risk being wrong on all on our own. The World Cup predictions would appear to bear that out.

The two leaders thus far are the FIFA Rankings and Andrew Yuan.  This is not surprising as they have 47 out of 48 Group Stage matches picked identically. Their ranking against each other will be decided by a single match.  This raises an important question with relevance far beyond the World Cup or sports: what is the point of a complex prediction methodology that essentially replicates a simpler, readily available index?

None of the methods are able to outperform the FIFA Rankings – thus far – providing some good evidence of their value in ranking teams. There are 24 group matches left to play, and no doubt more surprises are in store. However, the results so far indicate that while there is a lot of entertainment value in the World Cup predictions, there is little evidence of value added.

The next update will come after the 36th match, Croatia vs. Mexico on Monday. Stay tuned.

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Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor of environmental studies at the University of Colorado, where he also directs its Center for Science and technology Policy Research. He studies, teaches and writes about science, innovation, politics and sports. He has written for The New York TimesThe Guardian,FiveThirtyEight, and The Wall Street Journal among many other places. He is thrilled to join Sportingintelligence as a regular contributor. Follow Roger on Twitter: @RogerPielkeJR and on his blog

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Winning in global sport: Often about the money, money, money ….. (but not always)

Monday, May 5th, 2014

By Nick Harris

5 May 2014

It was self-evident in the 2012-13 Premier League that Queens Park Rangers provided their owner with the worst value for money. He spent many tens of millions on buying players and many tens of millions more on paying their wages. And they were ignominiously relegated anyway.

But precisely how badly did they do in terms of resources and performance? And which team did best?

What does this tell us about the relationship between pay and performance in the Premier League? And how does that compare to other football leagues, and indeed other major sports? These are questions Sportingintelligence tries to address using the Global Salary Survey (click for details), as reported here and here.

This article scrapes the surface of giving an overview of an answer for eight leagues: The Premier League, La Liga, Bundesliga, Serie A, NFL, NHL, NBA and MLB.

Given that QPR had average first-team pay of £2.1m per player last season and earned 25 points, we can quantify that they spent £85,704 per man per point. That was the worst value by far in the Premier League, with Everton (£27,397 per man per point) giving the best value.

This is how the rest of the division performed:

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Prem CPPPP .

The relationship between pay and performance in the Premier League has been close for many years. This linked article from two years ago goes into more detail, while this one from December 2012 used economic performance to predict QPR’s demise.

The more you spend on wages, the better you do, and vice versa, all other things being equal. And therein lies the beauty of sport. High-spenders can often find ways to cock things up, and low spenders can punch above their weight.

This next graphic plots the wage spending last season, 1 to 20, against finish position 1 to 20, and also depicts the salary spread graphically. You can see at a glance how QPR under-achieved and Everton punched above their weight. You can also see (right-hand chart) how below the top eight spenders, there is a large degree of similarity in pay among the rest of the clubs. What looks like random finishing positions in the left-hand chart are perhaps explained by there not being especially significant variations in wages in the first place.

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PL pvp 2012-13

 

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The following six graphics are the equivalent information for La Liga, Serie A and the Bundesliga.

Below them, we move on to the four major North American leagues.

La Liga pvp 2012-13

La Liga CPPPP

Serie A pvp 2012-13 season

Serie A CPPPP

Bundesliga 2012-13 pvp

Bundesliga CPPPP

 

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North American major sports

There has long been a perception the North American sports are somehow ‘fairer’ because of drafts and wage caps.

But by using the same unique metric as we use across the 15 leagues in seven sports in 12 countries in the GSSS 2014, it is clear that there remains a relationship between pay and performance.

The situation for the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB are summarised in graphic form below and are self-explanatory.

But a summary of the relationship is thus:

  • In the NFL 2013 season ending in 2014 SuperBowl, six of the 10 best paid teams were among the 12 play-off teams, and only one of the ten worst-paid teams was there.
  • Both the Super Bowl teams, the Seahawks and Broncos, were in the top four best-paid teams, the winning Seahawks at No2.
  • In the NBA 2013-14 season (ongoing at the time of writing), seven of the 10 best paid teams were among the 16 play-off teams and only three of the 10 worst paid teams.
  • At the NBA Conference semi-finals stage, five of the eight teams involved are among the 10 best paid teams, none are from the worst paid 10 teams.
  • In the NHL 2013-14 season (ongoing at the time of writing), eight of the 10 best paid teams were among the 16 play-off teams and only three of the 10 worst paid teams.
  • At the NHL Conference semi-finals stage, six of the eight teams involved are among the 10 best paid teams, none are from the worst paid 10 teams.
  • The Major League Baseball season is only in its early stages, but already there are patterns of better results for better paid teams. Those ranked 1-10 in the pay rankings have an average win % of 0.543 (at the time of writing). Those 11-20 have an average win % of 0.504; and those ranked 21-30 have an average win % of 0.456.

Details at the foot of this article about how to obtain a free copy of the Global Salaries Report that forms the basis of this analysis.

Click to enlarge any of these graphics

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NFL pvp 2013-14

NBA pvp 2013-14

NHL pvp 2013-14

MLB pvp 2014

 

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GSSS 2014 coverMore from Nick Harris

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Obtain the full Global Sports Salaries report (left) FREE by clicking this sentence to send an email. (Write GSSS 2014 in the subject line, and your name / organisation in the email)NB: reports are being emailed on an individual basis so please be patient if you don’t get it immediately

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‘GFH have focussed purely on controlling the narrative, not on running Leeds United’

Wednesday, March 26th, 2014

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WHEN GFH Capital, a Dubai arm of Bahrain-based bank GFH, bought Leeds United in December 2012, executives including Salem Patel appeared on national television to assure the fans his company had the funds to take Leeds places. Patel said on the BBC (link here for video): “We wouldn’t have bought this club if we didn’t have the money in place to make this club successful. And it’s as simple as that.” Except GFH’s reign has been anything but simple. It has been a period of chaos and confusion, empty promises and false starts, farce and failure, and threatened meltdown. Events are now reaching a critical point because new owner-in-waiting, convicted fraudster Massimo Cellino, has been told he is not a fit and proper person to take over. As fans wait to see what happens next, supporter Amitai Winehouse explains how GFH Capital for a long time ruled by PR, telling fans privately what they wanted to hear, while also asking them how to run the club. This feature is reproduced with the kind permission of the Square Ball fanzine, where it appeared in the latest issue (below right).

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AmitaiBy Amitai Winehouse

26 March 2014

About eleven months ago, I had a very significant shouting match with my mum. We were arguing about Salem Patel. That doesn’t sound like the sort of thing most people argue about with their parents, but then again, I’d had a weird few months.

It really doesn’t surprise me that the last few months have gone like they have for Leeds United, because eleven months ago, I was forced to cut off contact with a director at Leeds United. Back then I was a 20-year-old student at Newcastle University, studying history and running a blog about football on the side.

Twelve months ago I wrote an open letter to GFH Capital and stuck it on the website, the result of a frustrating few days as a fan and a desire to see GFH make some changes at the club. They’d talked about a vague concept that they regularly called engagement, so I thought maybe they’d listen. But I didn’t expect as much engagement as actually occurred.

It began with being invited to meet Salem Patel for a few hours after the Spurs FA Cup win last season. I went along, meeting him at the Malmaison, and he seemed like a nice guy, but some of the things he asked were way above my head. “Who should we appoint as manager, Paul Lambert or Nigel Adkins?” isn’t a question you should be asking anyone when you’re the man running a football club, never mind asking a student who, really, just supports the team.

I knew who we were going to sign several days before the busy deadline day, and knew we were trying to sign Chris Burke because Salem had happened to see him have a good game against Leeds in the FA Cup. I kept that information to myself. I suppose I was meant to,  but I also wasn’t exactly keen to rush to join the horde of in-the-knows on Twitter.Square Ball

A moment from that meeting sticks with me to this day. At that point, despite the cup win earlier in the day, I was absolutely open with my dislike of Neil Warnock. One of the things I said he’d been doing wrong was his mistreatment of Ross McCormack. Salem then happily pointed out that Warnock and GFH had tried to sell Ross in the previous two windows due to perceived attitude issues. Given how utterly reliant we’ve been on Ross ever since, it shows how little GFH knew and know about football, trusting the opinion of Warnock outright. If it weren’t for Ross’s clear affinity for the club, we’d be in real trouble.

At some point, El Hadji Diouf showed up with a party of guests, spotted Salem and came over to talk. It was 11pm, but Diouf added impetus to the conversation. What came out of a thirty minute chat with him? Salem was pressing him to ask his friend Habib Habibou to drop his wage demands if he wanted to join us. We talked about Aruna Dindane, and it turned out Diouf was helping players he knew get trials at the club. Diouf also came across as someone in absolute love with Leeds United and the idea of helping us get promoted. I left the Malmaison a bit overwhelmed by the day’s events, which had started with Luke Varney putting us ahead against Spurs.

The entire Salem thing started to become a bit shambolic when the direct messages started pouring in on Twitter. I had returned to Newcastle and carried on with my life. I remember receiving a message from Salem after the Cardiff game, when I was on my way to a house party, asking what I thought about the new signings. I didn’t really know why they needed my opinion, but it turns out it was quite simple – they had no idea.

Later, a report appeared on the internet about GFH Capital’s finances, and I took that information and put together a post about it for my blog, like I had been doing for the previous year about Ken Bates. Things didn’t look great, so I thought Leeds fans deserved to know about it. Around the same time, I also retweeted another person’s piece that asked questions of GFH. Obviously, a message came through from Salem, telling me that what I’d written and proliferated had been a falsehood, that people with an agenda against GFH had written it and that I shouldn’t have posted it. I just thought this was a man defending his company, so I let it slip by.

It was around this point that I began to notice other people on Twitter regurgitating the messages that I’d received from Salem almost verbatim. People began tweeting out regular questions like “How much should Leeds season tickets cost?” I had been asked by Salem to do the same, but thought it wasn’t my place – I didn’t work for the club, so why was it my job to carry out market research for them? It began to worry me that the club was making decisions over its financial future based on what people tweeted back to fan sites.

Further incidents ruffled me and caused the aforementioned shouting match. My mum, one of the friendliest people I know, was keen that I didn’t upset anyone. She said that I should start talking to Salem again. I began to tell her that, firstly, my duty when writing on my blog was to fans, not to some investment bank in Bahrain; and secondly, that what had been asked of me was unacceptable because of that, because it would make me an unpaid tool of the club. Two days later, she apologised to me – she’d told her friends what had happened and they’d said I was in the right.

GFH ran the Watch Leeds 4 Less promotion, hoping to see it boost attendances. Admittedly, it increased the attendance relative to other games that season, but they were clearly keen to see it work to prove a point to the previous regime. Salem asked me to write a post on my site detailing the scheme, and, even though I have since lost the transcript, pretty much asked me to say that if fans didn’t attend, such a scheme wouldn’t be run again. I thought this was unacceptable.

The second moment that made me realise I couldn’t speak to them any further was after there had been talk of a takeover attempt by Steve Parkin. I acted a bit foolishly on WACCOE, getting into an argument about the potentially good stuff that I’d heard was behind the deal, but, as I said, I was only 20 years old, and I could have been far worse. Again, a message came through from Salem in which I was basically told that what I had said on WACCOE was being watched, and that it was wrong. It was then that the truth hit me, and I realised why Salem and GFH cared so much. They were concerned about what people with a voice could do.

This is why I’m absolutely not surprised that the last few months have gone like they have. GFH have been focused purely on controlling the narrative from the very moment they took over Leeds United, no matter how they were truly running the club in the background. Whenever their guard has slipped, we’ve seen moments that demonstrated their inadequacy, like Salah Nooruddin calling for McDermott’s head on Twitter after a loss (since deleted).

It’s been clear that there have been issues brewing in the background, but there has been little in the way of dissenting voices from expected sources except from this magazine and a select few others. It’s understandable that those working in the media itself have been limited as to what they could say, given their need to be able to cover the football itself, but even they have done a great job of uncovering information where possible. Those who write for the fans, however, didn’t do their duty to them. People had their heads turned by attention from higher ups.

This is what the GFH period at Leeds has taught me – that word from the fans scares club owners more than anything else. Don’t doubt it for a second: our reaction at the Huddersfield game saved Brian McDermott’s job, however temporarily. We have the power to alter things, and sitting there helps nothing. People forgot what they needed to do because of who they talked to; they forgot what power their word had, and because of that, we find ourselves in a situation where the true state of the club has come as a shock.

A last thought: Salem Patel seemed like a nice guy in person. Salah Nooruddin promised “goodies.” David Haigh tweeted about “side before self.” And yet they have sold our club to the highest bidder with no regard for what he might do, after nearly running us into the ground in just over a year. These men will all still have a say at the new Leeds United.

Don’t trust them for a second.

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Amitai Winehouse can be found blogging at www.thesquareball.net/blog and is on Twitter @awinehouse1

Sportingintelligence would like to hear from any other Leeds fans who have been privately given false promises about Leeds over the past 18 months. Contact details are on this page.

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‘Believe nothing in Turkish football – it is rotten to the core and nobody will act’

Tuesday, March 18th, 2014

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At the end of the 2010-11 Turkish football season, Fenerbahçe were crowned champions after finishing with the same number of points (82) as title rivals Trabzonspor, but with a better head-to-head record. But Turkish football was soon rocked as it emerged Fenerbahçe’s success was a result of one of the most devastating match-fixing scandals the game has seen. A long police investigation uncovered a sophisticated crime syndicate that had been involved in fixing games, with dozens of high-profile officials and players implicated. Yet despite legal rulings and sporting rulings that should have seen Fenerbahçe relegated and multiple offenders jailed or otherwise punished, many of those involved remain active across Turkish football, on and off the pitch. With Fenerbahce again topping the table and favourites to lift another title, ENDER KUYUMCU argues what is happening in his country is football’s greatest shame; and that if Turkey’s football authorities continue to fail to clean up their game, then all Turkey’s clubs, and the national team, should be banned from all international competitions.

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Ender KuyumcuBy Ender Kuyumcu 

18 March 2014

It has been an open secret within Turkey for many years that football in my country has been corrupt, riddled with fixing and not to be trusted. This has been happening for 25 years or more. Even the kids in Turkey know this. It is part and parcel of Turkish football – corruption, criminality, cheating. And it is wrong.

The difference in recent years, since 2011, is that the corruption has been proved, with hard evidence, beyond any shadow of doubt. People have been arrested from the board rooms to the dressing rooms. There have been wire taps and photographic evidence, confessions and criminal charges and trials and guilty verdicts. This is not hearsay any more, it is irrefutable fact – and still the Turkish system tries to cover it up.

Can you imagine a situation where, for example, it had been proven in court that leading officials and players from Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and other clubs had fixed games – and that they were allowed to play on as if nothing had happened? Would that be a scandal? I suggest it would be portrayed across the world as one of the greatest scandals any sport had seen, ever. And rightly so.

And yet that is what continues to happen in Turkish football. At heart of the corruption is Fenerbahce, but they are not the only club involved. It has been shown beyond doubt that in the 2010-11 season alone, corruption went from pitch to presidency level not only at Fenerbahce but also at Besiktas, Sivasspor and Manisaspor, and that many other clubs and players were involved in one or more corrupt matches.

And they still are. In a moment I will tell you the names and details of senior officials and match-fixing players who continue to be a central part of Turkish football as if nothing has happened.

As campaigners for clean football, our message is clear. If the Turkish football federation does not clean up the game in Turkey, as the courts and football bodies like Uefa have indicated they should, then those football bodies – Uefa and Fifa – should stop all Turkish clubs playing in international competitions until they do.

So no Turkey in World Cup or Euro qualifying. No Galatasaray in the Champions League, as they will be today at Chelsea. No Turkish football in any international competition – because frankly it is rotten.

What we want is clear: for Uefa to enforce their own regulations in regard to match fixing and ensure that the Turkish FA relegates the clubs proven to be involved in fixing. There are precedents: Uefa made sure that Pobeda of Macedonia and Valou of Greece were relegated after proven fixing. Why do they not act in Turkey?

We only want Uefa to follow their rules and regulations, nothing more. Uefa, after all, are the ones put Fenerbahce and Besiktas on trial (in football terms) and found them guilty of match-fixing and punished them with European expulsion, albeit for a limited time. But according to the disciplinary procedures of the Turkish Football Federation (TFF), Uefa and Fifa, the punishment for match-fixing must be relegation. So why has it not happened? Who is protecting who? Why?

UEFA has to order the TFF to relegate match-fixing teams and if the TFF refuses to do this, then ban all Turkish teams, including the national teams, from all European competition until justice is served.

Why? Because until that happens you cannot believe a thing you see in Turkish football.

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The 2010-11 scandal

Fenerbahce were at the centre of it, charged with fixing 12 matches in spring 2011 which helped them to 16 wins in their last 17 games to be crowned champions ahead of Trabzonspor. Dozens of officials including Aziz Yildirim (still chairman of Fenerbahce), were arrested and several players, managers and agents were also charged in the match-fixing investigation. After a year, the criminal court gave its verdicts and sentenced 21 officials and players for manipulating the results of matches in the 2010-2011 season.

Some of the others involved in match-fixing, bribe-giving or bribe taking who were charged and then given prison terms and / or fines and bans included Fenerbahce vice-presidents Şekip Mosturoğlu and İlhan Ekşioğlu, director Aleaddin Yıldırım, Sivasspor board member Ahmet Çelebi, Fenerbahce chief financial officer Tamer Yelkovan, Fenerbahce legal advisor Sami Dinç, sporting director Cemil Turan, club translator Samet Güzel, Sivas president Mecnun Odyakmaz, Eskişehir manager Bülent Uygun and a whole array of players.

İbrahim Akın (then with İstanbul BB) is serving a ban but still managed to get a contract as a player with Gaziantepspor. Korcan Çelikay was and remains Sivasspor’s goalkeeper despite a prison term for match fixing; Mehmet Yıldız,  formerly of Sivasspor, also got a prison term for fixing but is now a striker with Mersin IdmanyurduGökçek Vederson is a Brazilian-Turkish player sentenced to five months for match fixing at Bursaspor and is now playing with Antalyaspor.

Ümit Karan got seven months for fixing at Eskisehirspor and is now retired from playing, and makes a living as a commentator, sometimes even appearing in that role on Government-owned TV.  İskender Alın is a striker at Boluspor, despite a prison term for fixing at Istanbul BB.

These are just a few names that demonstrate the range of people – players and otherwise – implicated in fixing and still involved in football. There were – maybe are? – still lots of others.

How did the fixing happen? I won’t bore you with lots of details but the nuts and bolts are out there in thousands of pages of evidence and court transcripts. Here is a flavour from the deposition of one player, Ibrahim Akin.

“I met my agent at a restaurant called Big Chefs three days before the game after his request. He told me that Fenerbahçe SK offered me $100,000 for not scoring a goal against them. I wasn’t warm to the idea at first … Following [another] request I sent a text message to [my agent] and asked for €100,000 instead of $100,000.”

As it transpired, Ibrahim Akin’s case was one of several where the guilty party had leaner punishment because the interpretation of the laws was changed so they were guilty not of match-fixing but attempts. Some 48 officials, players and coaches were found guilty of fixing and 44 others were cleared.

But the situation was made much less clear when the Turkish parliament changed the law governing sporting crimes (law No6222) to reduce sentences for sports-related crime. This in effect gave many of those guilty a ‘get out of jail free.’

Astonishing, I know, but this happened and continues.

With the political interventions, match-fixing sanctions were amended, so the activities of individuals (officials, players, coaches) and the legal entities for whom they worked (their clubs) were differentiated, and therefore the clubs benefited because they were ‘in the clear’ even as their employees were convicted. More here and here.

Uefa took years to deal with Fenerbahce and Besiktas but did eventually ban them from Europe. Following this decision Fenerbahce took this case to Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) as did Besiktas; CAS upheld both bans.

At this stage, football lovers in Turkey were expecting Uefa to prove that really are strict in their ‘zero tolerance’ policy on match-fixing, and therefore order the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) to relegate all teams involved in fixing, starting with Fenerbahce and Besiktas.

Both Gianni Infantino, the general secretary of UEFA, and Michel Platini, the president of UEFA, had declared at various points that if the TFF failed to apply the necessary punishment, UEFA would get involved and make sure that the relevant punishment was applied, which is relegation, according to the rules and regulations.

Match-fixing clubs have been relegated previously, infamously: Juventus, Marseille and others know that all too well. So why have Uefa not acted on Turkey?

Certainly among large numbers of Turkish football fans, it raised speculation that Uefa will not act, for reasons unknown. And then recently we got what seems to be an answer: a leaked voice recording of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan apparently revealing that he could not manage to get Fenerbahce off the hook with Uefa over fixing but that, with the help of a Turkish Uefa vice-president, Senes Erzik, had succeeded in saving Fenerbahce from relegation.

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Political Intervention in Critical Moments 

From the outside, Turkey’s fixing scandal may appear to have been handled correctly in many ways: a police investigation, arrests, charges, trials and punishments. But the truth is that people’s belief in justice and fair play have gradually died out, and this is closely related to the political interventions at critical moments of the “detox” of Turkish football.

One decisive intervention came on 24 November 2011, when the Turkish parliament gathered to amend Sports Law No6222 that had only been in effect since April 2011 – or just around the time that season was being fixed in Fenerbahce’s favour. Members of the ruling and two other opposition parties worked all night to change the law to reduced all sentences penalising various crimes in sport, including mainly match-fixing.

They claimed the law needed amending because it was “too harsh”. Not long after the amendment, a first official report revealed details of match fixing. What a coincidence!

With Fenerbahce officials in the vanguard, the club as well as leading newspapers and journalists with close links to the club effectively forced the Turkish Football Federation to amend its disciplinary code that stipulates relegation for match manipulation and attempted fixing. They claimed the Turkish football economy would sink without Fenerbahce in the top division.

The TFF president Mehmet Ali Aydınlar, who had links to Fenerbahce, resigned, under pressure, with enormous speculation that he either felt he could not be the man who saw Fenerbahce relegated, or had been threatened that he should not become that man. He was replaced by Yildirim Demirören, who resigned as the chairman of Besiktas (another match-fix club) to take up the TFF role. Perhaps not surprisingly, the TFF has still not acted to relegate the match-fixing clubs. We wonder why.

Actually, we know why. The new TFF regime restructuring their ethical committee to clear any clubs (as entities) of blame.  Prime Minister Erdoğan stated his belief that individuals involved in match-fixing should face punishment, but that sanctions against clubs could mean punishment for millions of fans. The newly-elected president, recently formerly of Besiktas, stood by the Prime Minister’s view.

In May last year, the new TFF ethical committee announced final decisions, blurring matters further; attempted fixing was no longer fixing or punishable as such. The committee concluded that “alleged attempts to fix games had not altered the course of the matches.” Four days later, Turkey’s Professional Football Discipline Committee (PFDK) handed out punishments to officials, players, managers and employees of Fenerbahce, Beşiktaş, Eskişehirspor FC, İBB FC, Sivasspor and Bursaspor – but said that the clubs could not be blamed over individuals’ activities. So all the clubs were cleared.

So Fenerbahce remain in the top division. Or to be precise, at the top of the top division.

And Uefa’s ‘zero tolerance’ on fixing is looking lame, in Turkey at least.

Rich teams can get away with murder. Our game is not being played fair. And Turkish fans will have to keep wondering, as ever, whether they are actually watching football … or just more theatre.

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Man Utd kings among PL ‘ever presents’ but Chelsea on verge of usurping Arsenal

Friday, March 14th, 2014

By Brian Sears

14 March 2014

Seven clubs have been ever-present (EP) in the 22 seasons of the Premier League and six of them are in the top seven in the current table; this is no coincidence.

Chelsea, Liverpool and Arsenal in first, second and third place before this weekend’s games, as well as Tottenham, Manchester United and Everton (in fifth, sixth, seventh) are all ‘big’ clubs relative to most other clubs in England, by trophies, attendance, income or pretty much any other measure. Aston Villa (11th currently) are the seventh EP club and also fit that bill.

Manchester City, whose recent prominence has been fuelled by Abu Dhabi petrodollars and start the weekend fourth, are the only non-EP team in the current top seven.

Six of the EP teams face each other this weekend, which makes them a topical subject. Villa host Chelsea on Saturday before Manchester United and Liverpool reprise the most significant long-term rivalry in English football on Sunday ahead of Tottenham hosting Arsenal in the north London derby.

Before the current season started, the seven EP teams had each played the others combined 252 times in the Premier League, or six matches at home and six away against six opponents for 21 years.

And this first graphic demonstrates how their record against each other, overall, equated quite well over time to their success in the Premier League era. In other words, Manchester United dominated the ‘EP games’ – and the league in the era. Then Arsenal and Chelsea fared next best in the EP games, and shared next most success overall. Then Liverpool were fourth best in EP games and had the best finish (second) outside of the title-winning clubs, followed by Tottenham, Villa and Everton.

For readers too young to remember, Villa were runners-up in the first Premier League season; and they have not been close to that since. Tottenham and Everton have peaked as high as fourth place. But things are changing, as we’ll see in a moment.

Article continues below

PL EP 92-13

This season, Chelsea are the leading team in the ‘inter EP’ matches, winning five and drawing three of their nine games so far against their EP rivals for a total of 18 points in these games or two points per match on average. They are followed closely by Liverpool, with Everton a step back in third. These three teams are all ‘trending’ better in performance terms this season than they have over the 21 Premier League seasons previously as a whole.

In contrast Arsenal and United are both doing worse against their EP rivals this season than typically, United much worse. And Tottenham are doing better this season in points per game against their EP rivals but the same relatively (fifth of seven); and Villa are doing worse than their long-term average, and worse relatively compared to all the other teams.

Article continues below

PL EP 13-14

When we add the records for the 21 completed seasons before this campaign  to this season’s records we get the table below.

This shows a few things clearly:

1) There is a ‘big four’ within the EP seven and they are United, Chelsea, Arsenal and Liverpool. We might argue English football has a big six or aspirant seven or many other things, but this ‘big four’ plus arrivistes City remain for now the ‘Big 5′ in English football.

2) Chelsea are on the brink of usurping Arsenal as the second force of English football behind United over the PL era as a whole. Right now they are virtually level pegging with 407 points at 1.56 PPG each from 261 EP7 games apiece (as well as three PL titles apiece), with Chelsea having just risen above Arsenal in the all-time EP7 table on goal difference. What happens between now and the end of the season will determine which of the pair ends this campaign in second place to United.

3) United require just a point against Liverpool this weekend to become the first of the EP7 teams to take 500 points from the others combined in the PL era.

PL EP 1992 to date

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More on Man City / Chelsea / Man Utd / Arsenal (or search for anything else in box at top right)

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